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Abstract
This paper analyzes the imbalance between e-commerce and logistics service by using factor sub-game perfect 
Nash equilibrium as an analytical tool from the view of system and links up the bargaining process between sellers 
and express enterprise involved in service engineering during online shopping with discount factor. The change of 
interests between sellers and express enterprise is systematically analyzed from the perspective of discount factor on 
the equilibrium solution through the application of model towards service engineering during holidays online 
shopping. Finally it is concluded that discount factor is a key factor influencing the express fee between sells and 
express enterprise in logistic system, and some recommendations are put forward accordingly.
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1. Introduction
With the development of commerce trading platform, more and more consumers make online shopping in 
service engineering as their first choice to purchase goods. Especially on holidays, online shopping sales of various 
products have huge increase in varying degrees, for example, during Spring Festival, online shopping sales grew 
over 160 percent, the daily trading volume are about 80 percent higher than usual. However, the large number of 
orders and sales exceed express enterprise’s normal volume of operation system, meanwhile, couriers return home 
successively and there is no extra staff transfer course in service engineering during holidays, service that the 
couriers offered cannot meet the demand for logistics services during the holidays, and then temporary " shortage of
logistics " phenomenon in logistic system of enterprise in service engineering arose.
In order to meet the demand for the market, ease “shortage of logistics” in service engineering that happens
during the holiday, express enterprise need more funding to ensure full year operation as usual standards, this 
increase the operation cost of the logistic system in express enterprise involved in service engineering, they should 
arise the express fee transfer to logistics demander in order to reduce the cost loss. However, the purpose of seeking 
profit determined its nature. During the bargaining process, as the two parties involved in the logistics service
engineering, express enterprise and sellers need to maximize relatively profit and to seek more reasonable delivery 
fee in order to release the “shortage of logistics” in service engineering that happens during holiday, thus it is a 
game problem that take place in the profitability and market development of express delivery companies.
Currently, there are many studies related to the bottlenecks of e-commerce logistics distribution in service 
engineering, Tang Shiqiang and other scholars state that the breakthrough of e-commerce logistic bottlenecks is to 
establish an efficient and reasonable modern logistics distribution system. Ran Baosong explores the answer of 
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logistics shortage during Chinese traditional Spring Festival from the perspective of online shopping platform’s self-
built logistics. David B. Grant and other scholars point out that the key to improve quality and efficiency of 
operation is dealing with the balance of cost between online shopping retailers and logistics distribution Company
through their research. In short, the discussion of releasing online shopping “shortage of logistics” in service 
engineering mainly focus on systematic analysis of the lag situation of e-commerce logistics distribution, it seldom 
related to logistics bottlenecks in service engineering during holidays and lack of realistic theoretical model to 
further study this problem systematically. This paper bring in time variable (discount factor) based on Nash static 
equilibrium according to Robin stein bargaining model, gain sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium solution and 
proposed some applicable suggestion of this model towards service engineering during holidays from the view of 
system.
2. An analysis of the formation of online shopping “shortage of logistics” 
The imbalance between logistics supply and demand service market lead to the appearance of temporary 
“shortage of logistics” phenomenon in service engineering, which affect the process of normal distribution business, 
but the payment balance of express fee related to the two parties involved in express delivery is the underlying 
causes that generate this phenomenon
When online shopping transaction happens, the buyer and express enterprise did not take place fee contact 
directly, but take indirect fee payment through seller, that means seller of online shopping contact express enterprise 
and pay express fee forward for the buyer, therefore express enterprise and seller take online shopping transaction as 
the two parties of logistics service. Only if the two parties reach a consensus with the price of logistics service 
(express fee) during bargaining, express delivery transaction can progress smoothly. However, the equilibrium is 
broken by the unbalance of logistics supply and demand service market during holidays. When the supply of 
logistics service market cannot meet the demand, express enterprise hope to gain funds through increasing express 
fee, in order to encourage more courier staying in their jobs and attract more workforce joining in courier service to 
make the supply and demand of logistics service market back to equilibrium.
However, the express enterprise and the seller both have the tendency to pursue self-interest maximization, 
they all hope to minimize their own delivery cost after accomplish the business deal. The transaction gain that 
allocated between the two parties as unit “1” is the discrepancy between the highest price that seller will to pay and 
the lowest price that express enterprise will to accept. When the two parties reach a consensus in how to share this 
unit “1” during bargaining, the new equilibrium state is formed to keep the transaction progressing sequentially. 
Therefore, the game process of online shopping express fee during holidays is a repeated Zero-sum game process 
that express enterprise as logistics service supplier and seller as logistics service demander bargain to reach a 
consensus on logistics service price.
In summary, for the reason of fierce unbalance of logistics service engineering market during the holidays, the 
equilibrium state of the two parties of logistics service is broken, express delivery cannot progress smoothly, thus
express enterprise and seller involved in service engineering need to take express fee game to re-establish a more 
reasonable equilibrium fee price that satisfied by both parties. Under this equilibrium state, the phenomenon of 
“shortage of logistics” in service engineering can be alleviated; the supply and demand of logistics service 
engineering market can reach a balance.
3. Model Formulation
3.1. The basic assumptions
1. During game process of express fee payment, assuming there are two players, one is S (express enterprise), 
another is B (seller). They bargain for the allocated rest and bid alternately. Firstly, player B bid P1 for the logistics 
service, then player B pay P1, player S pay ˄ 11 P ˅ in the first stage.
2. In the game model, provided player S (express enterprise) and player B (seller) share gains of unit "1". 
Strategy set of player B is ]1,0[BP and that of player S is ]1,0[Ps .
3. Firstly assuming player B bid P1 for logistics services, then player S accepts or refuses the price. If player S 
accept it, the first round game finish and the transaction is completed on this bid. But if player S refuses the first bid, 
he should make a counteroffer P2. Player B accepts or refuses the counteroffer, and then this round finish. There is 
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no limit about the number of bid round, only if the player refuses the bid, game will progress sequentially, and the 
game will progress forever theoretically.
4. The discount factor of the two players are G sˈG B respectively, and ]1,0[sG ˈ ]1,0[BG . Because of 
the cost of negotiation and the loss of interest, bargain one more round, the express fee that the two players take 
should multiplyG . The discount factor is determined by the “patience” of the two players toward logistics service, 
the less patience, the lower discount factorG is.
5. Assuming this game has infinite number of sub-game, one of the sub-games is the game itself. Use G1
represents this game. Assuming this game has at least a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. In the sub-game perfect 
Nash equilibrium of G1, QB and qB represents the maximum and minimum gain of player B respectively. Another 
sub-game of the whole game is called game G2, which begin with the sub root that player S make the first 
counteroffer to player B. QS and qS represents the maximum and minimum gain that player S can get from the sub-
game perfect Nash equilibrium of G2 respectively. The third sub-game begins with the sub root that player B makes 
the second bid to player S, which is called game G3. Game G3 and game G1 has the same pattern of beginning that is 
player B bid to player S.
6. If there is no difference that the player accept or refuse the bid, assuming accept the bid, the bargaining game 
has an only sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium.
3.2. Game process of express fee payment
In the first round of express fee bargaining game model, firstly, seller of online shopping bid P1 for logistics 
service, seller (player B) and express enterprise (player S) pay )1,( 11 PP  respectively, that means the express fee 
that seller paid is P1, and the express enterprise is asked to pay ˄1ˉP1˅, the express enterprise accept and refuse 
this bid. If express enterprise accepts the bid P1, the game of first round finish and the transaction is completed on 
this bid. If it refuses this bid, then they go into the second round.
In the second round, express enterprise makes a counteroffer P2 and asks seller paying P2, if the seller accept 
the counteroffer P2, the express fee that seller pays is įSÂ P2 and express enterprise pays is įSÂ˄1ˉP2˅. If seller 
refuse this bid, the game progress sequentially and they go into the third round.
The third round and the round after reason by analogy, assuming two players make a deal in period t, the seller 
and express enterprise pay ))1(,( t
t
St
t
B PP xx GG respectively.
3.3. Equilibrium solution of express fee game 
According to the assumption, G1 represent for the sub-game that seller of online shopping bid to express 
enterprise, G2 represent the opposite process, and these sub-games have at least a sub-game perfect Nash 
equilibrium. In the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of G1, QB and qB represents the maximum and minimum gain 
of seller respectively, QS and qS represents the maximum and minimum gain that express enterprise can get from the 
sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of G2 respectively.
In the first round of G1, the seller, in order to get the opportunity to make its bid accepted (that is, to make its 
sub-game perfect), express enterprise must receive at least ss qxG . This is for the reason that once the game goes 
into the sub-game G2, express enterprise must gain qS and the next round of this game must be discounted by sG . If 
the express enterprise gain at least ss qxG , and the total number of allocation is unit “1”, then the maximum that the 
seller gain is )(1 SS qx G . That means, 
)(1 SSB qQ xd G                                      ˄1˅
And so on, the boundaries of qB can be obtained. If the bid that seller offers to express enterprise is greater than 
or equal to SS QxG , express enterprise accept it. Therefore, in the sub-game G1, there is no meaning if the bid of 
sell exceed SS QxG . This means seller can gain at least )(1 SS Qx G immediately, namely,
        )(1 SSB Qq xt G                                 ˄2˅
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In the sub-game G2, if seller refuse the counteroffer that express enterprise offered, the game goes into sub-
game G3, seller make its second bid. It’s easy to prove that reversed the previous logic location of seller and express 
enterprise can get restrict as follows,
)(1 BBS qQ xd G                                 ˄3˅
)(1 BBS Qq xt G                                  ˄4˅
Simultaneous inequalities ˄1˅˄2˅˄3˅˄4˅can get result,
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In summary, this bargaining game has an only sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium, the sub-game perfect 
solution is )
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3.4. Interpretation of equilibrium solution
In the game model, discount factor SG represents the supply degree of logistics service that express enterprise 
offers, BG represents the demand degree of logistics service that seller offers.
1. If BG fixed, 1oSG , the sub-game perfect equilibrium solution is (0,1), seller almost pay all of the express 
fee. The greater SG is, bargaining one more round, the lower loss of express enterprise takes, therefore it seems has 
more patience. Similarly, if SG fixed, 1oBG , it means that seller has more patience, express enterprise will take 
the whole fee. When the discount factor of seller is fixed, express enterprise is more patient and the express fee it 
pays is less. Conversely, when the discount factor of express enterprise is fixed, seller is more patient and the 
express fee it pays is less. As shown in figure 1.
Figure 1˖The influence of discount factor towards profit of the two parties
2. If 0 SG , for seller, if only 10  BG , they will not take any express fee, because 0 SG means that 
express enterprise has no patience, it will accept any bid without bargaining. On the contrary, for the express 
enterprise, the situation is not necessarily so, if 10  SG , and 0 BG , the profit that seller gain is SG1 , express 
enterprise gains SG . Therefore, seller bid first, even only gain SG1 , is much better than the situation of express 
enterprise.
3. If 1exp   GGG sellerress , sub-game perfect solution is )2
1
1
,
2
1
1
1
( 

!
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G
G
, namely express 
enterprise always pays more fees than seller. As shown in figure 2.
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Figure 2˖The profit comparison of the two parties when sellerpress GG  ex
4. If both seller and express enterprise have patience, 1oG , so who bid first has little relations toward 
express fee payment, so the two parties will pay the express fee equally.
In general, the player who bid first has little first mover advantage, but when the bargaining round is unlimited, 
who bid first has little influence toward game solution. When the number of possible round is infinite, the 
equilibrium profit of two players is determinate, which is only depends on the discount factor of them. Generally, 
the player who is more patient, namely whose discount factor is greater can get more than half of the profit. With the 
effect of discount factor, the value of the same share that player gets on this and next round is different. After 
discount, the share of next round only equals to the share of this round multiplyG , which is less than the share of 
this round. Thus, player should accept the reasonable bid that the counterpart offered as soon as possible, otherwise, 
even if the player get the same or even more share in the bargaining of next round may be less than the share of this 
round.
4. Application recommendations of game model during holiday
Through the game model of express fee bargaining, seller and express enterprise in service engineering re-
establish an equilibrium express fee that both parties satisfied. During the process of express fee bargaining, in order 
to reach a deal, two parties should rely on each other, but for the reason of diversity and randomness of choices that 
seller choose express enterprise, when the degree of increase in price are too high and the cooperation adversely, 
seller will turn to other express enterprise seeking cooperation. Thus, express enterprise often has no bid advantages 
during bargaining process. Under this curriculum, express enterprise should take full use of the profit it gains to 
improve the service level during holiday. Thus, in the bargaining process, the express delivery companies often do 
not have bid advantage. In this case, the express delivery companies should take full advantage of the gains to 
improve the level of service during the holidays.
Firstly, in order to alleviate the problem of low on-the-job rate, express enterprise can take sequential rest, 
motivate employees stay in their job by afford high wage or employ some local temporary worker to distribute 
goods during holidays. The demand of courier service during holidays is much more than usual, in order to meet the 
market demand which has sudden increase, express enterprise need sufficient workforce to afford courier service.
The method of sequential rest can let the courier service employee work more intense during holidays and arrange 
them rest in usual, this can enhance on-the-job rate of employees effectively. If express enterprise need workforce 
immediately, they can retain current employees by raising wage or employ some local temporary worker to 
distribute goods. In this way, the pressure of lacking workforce that express enterprise facing can be released and the 
inadequate supply of logistic services market can be make up. 
Besides, in order to improve the efficiency of logistics distribution, express enterprise can use the profit buying 
advanced equipments. Such as, changing distribution tools from artificial or semi-automatic bicycle to the faster cars, 
buying sorting machine replace artificial sorting goods and so on. Thus means using limited human resources meet 
more logistics demand, raise efficiency of work and alleviate conditions of resource shortage of express enterprise 
In addition, express enterprises can take cooperation during the holidays for resource sharing and realize win-
win in the industry. Express enterprises which have the ability to get the order can apportion their orders to other 
small enterprises, and express enterprises which have the ability of distribution can use its resources help other 
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enterprise share the pressure of order. In this way, they can realize win-win cooperation through the internal 
specialization and cooperation.
In addition, the express delivery companies can take a cooperative approach between the sharing of resources 
during the holidays, to achieve a win-win industry. Have the ability to get orders of express delivery companies can
not meet its share of orders to other companies, and have the ability to make a delivery courier companies can use 
their resources to help pressure other companies share the order by the division of labor within the industry to 
achieve win-win situation.
Through the above ways, the equilibrium solution of express fee in service engineering during holidays can 
form benign circulation in the operation process, which makes a balance between logistics supply and demand 
service engineering market. To some extent, the solution will ease "shortage of logistics" in service engineering that 
happens during the holiday, reach a real full year service and smooth the logistics flow.
5. Conclusion and future work  
This paper analyzes the phenomenon of the imbalance between the development of the electronic commerce 
and logistics service engineering from system perspective, and then it links up the bargaining process of the seller 
and express enterprise involved in logistic service engineering system with discount factor. The change of interests 
between sellers and express enterprise is systematically analyzed from the view of discount factor on the equilibrium 
solution through the application of model towards service engineering during holidays, and some recommendations 
are put forward accordingly to improve the efficiency in logistic service engineering system. Discount factor is the 
key factor which can influence the express fee payment, and the greater the discount factor is, the party is 
correspondingly at an advantage, which will afford less express fee.
This paper considers the time cost advantage between the two parties of the game-the influence towards
express fee of discount factors, but in the real game process, there are many factors that can influence finally fee 
payment, and uncertainty factors will make the results of the model more complex, which may lead to more 
balanced category and more complex results, and this is the next step for the research to solve.
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